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The Demand for Children in a
"Natural Fertility" Population
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The paper is concerned with two theories that proport to explain fertility
variations in developing countries. The first of these theories is based on
supply or naturalfertility considerations whilethe second looks to (the under-
lying) costs and benefits of children as one source explanation for fertility
differences. These theories indicate that demand consideration do explain
some of the systematic variation in fertility even among "noncontracepting"
populations.
Knowledge of factors that influence fertility levels and, therefore popula-
tion growth rates is a vital input into a variety of policy decisions in developing
nations. At this time, there is only limited information on what it is about
couples' environments, backgrounds, and personal characteristics that result
in their having many or few children, but among the competing theories, two
have emerged as leading contenders-the supply or natural fertility theories,
and the demand or choice theories.
These two theories lead to substantially different recommendations with
respect to policies aimed at lowering population growth rates. Efficient
resource allocation would, therefore, be well served if there were some evidence
on which of these theories best fits the fertility behaviour of couples in low
income and developing nations. The research presented below is an attempt
to supply this evidence for one important empirical relationship observed in
most developing countries-the negative partial correlation between a wife's
schooling and the number of children she has.
THE COMPETING THEORIESl
Natural fertility is, in the words of its most famous proponent, "the
fertility of a population that makes no deliberate attempt to limit births"
.The Rand Corporation. At the time this paper was written, the author was Research
Advisor with the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, and Associate with the
Population Council. He would like to thank Dick Goldman, Khalil Hamdani, Jeff Hammer,
Harvey Leibenstein, David Oot, and Warren Robinson for comments on an earlier draft.
lWhen the merits of alternative theories are debated, "truth" almost invariably lies
between the two extreme positions being taken, and such is surely the case here. For the sake
of simplicity and argument, however, I will treat the demand and supply explanations for
variations in fertility as mutualIy exclusive.
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[8, p. 2]. Since natural fertility is "primarily a biological phenomenon" (ibid.)~
it follows that in populations exhibiting this characteristic, desires for children
play no role in determining family resource allocation, with completed fertility
the (perhaps unintended) consequence of decisions made in other spheres of
family behaviour. While one might debate why such an important element in a
couple's life as children would be relegated to the category of residual claimant
in the household decision-making calculus, the concept of natural fertility has.
been popular among demographers and social scientists, especially as a means.
of describing demographic outcomes in traditional and developing societies.
Henry, in his seminal article on natural fertility [8], indicated that popula-
tions will seldom be observed in a state of "true" natural fertility, but modern
proponents of this concept have broadened it to include populations in which
there is no observable attempt to avoid pregnancy for the sake of limiting family
size [7], and/or where couples are vague or unconcerned about such concepts
as desired family size and "ideal" numbers of children. Accordingly, one
potential indicator of a society which is in or near a natural fertility state is.
whether couples in that society use or demand some form of modern contracep-
tion. If there is no use of modern contraception even in the face of adequate
supplies of contraception, it may be argued that parents have no desire to restrict
their family size beyond the limits impos~d by the biological processes involved
in conception and birth.2
In a natural fertility population, policies aimed at reducing population
growth rates are likely to fall into one of two categories-those aimed at
"educating" couples both about the benefits of sinall families, and about the
means of limiting family size (modern contraception, in particular), and those
aimed at increasing the availability and acceptability of different forms of con-
traception (family planning programmes, for example). Casu~l observation
would suggest that the majority of population-oriented policies in developing
natio~s, and certainly those in Pakistan, fall illto one or both of these categories.
and are, in that sense, based on the presumption of a natural fertility population.
The demand theory, in its most general form, postulates that children are
but one among many potential avenues through which couples can spend their
wealth. If that is the case, fertility decisions should be viewed in the same light
as any other consumption decision that couples make over their lifetime. 3 In
fact, it could be argued that given the sizable proportion of a couple's resources.
that go toward having and rearing children, desires for children could weH
dominate many other areas in which families make decisions. .
The main premise of the demand theory of family size is that children
are not showered on parents in some uncontrolled fashion, but are, rather, the
outcomes of implicit or explicit decision-making by parents. This theoretical
'If the reader is uncomfortable with the use of "natural fertility" to describe a Population
in this state, and would prefer some other term, so be it. This paper is not at all concerned
with usefulness of the concept, or exact definition of the term, natural fertility.
'For specific examples of this theory, see [3, 4, 121and especially [14].
~
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framework is based on the assumption that many of the factors that bear on
parental decisions to purchase consumption items from the marketplace (food,
.consumer durables, and so on) should also affect the "purchase" or production
.of children. Among the more important of these factors are the price that
parents have to pay in order to have and raise another child, and the amount of
resources that parents have at their disposal, that is, family income or wealth.
If children are like other items consumed by households, then, as the cost of
producing children rises, holding family wealth or income constant, the number
.of children desired and produced by parents will decline. Conversely if the
cost of children remains unchanged but family income rises, then parents will
want to consume (produce) more children as long as children are normal goods
in the economic sense of the term.
This theory is receiving growing acceptance as an explanation of fertility
differences in countries in which a substantial proportion of the married
population uses or has used some form of modern contraception; it is, how-
ever, often viewed with considerable scepticism in the context of traditional
and developing societies.' The gist of the criticism levelled at the use of these
models to understand fertility behaviour of, say, rural villagers in Pakistan is
that couples in that environment do not think rationally or even consciously
about the number of children they want. Partly this is a "proof of the pudding
is in the eating" issue-whether the theory is useful in studying fertility in
developing nations depends on whether it provides a framework or language
that helps us to understand better some of the regularities observed in the
behaviour of families and individuals living in those countries. This is an
empirical question not resolvable by debating the merits of the theory.
And partly, the issue centres on what one means by rationality and con-
scious decision-making. The important question with respect to demand
theories is: If people appear to have no conscious, or at least only very weak
preference for a particular number of children, can the demand theory be re-
jected out of hand? If the answer to this question is no, then the only means
.of determining which theory-demand or supply-is valid is through empirical
testing.
In this regard, consider the following argument. It is often said of low
,ncome and developing societies that tradition and culture 'dominate many of
the important decisions individuals make over their lifetimes. For example,
.couples are thought to have many children because community or societal
norms dictate the acceptability of large families. But how do norms or tradi-
tions come about? If it could be argued that norms in the area of, say, family
size, were originally based on the sorts of considerations that underlie the demand
model, then the fact that individuals do not undertake an elaborate choice
.calculus with regard to the numbers of children they have would in no way
negate the usefulness of demand-oriented theories of fertility.
'For some examples of this criticism, see [7, 10, 11].
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But, if norms are "rational" in the sense that they conform to the pre-
dictions of the demand model, who originally went through the calculations
necessary to derive these behavioural guides ?The answer may well be no one
person but society as a whole, with the process looking something like the
following: At any point in time, and over time, each family carries out an
experiment in resource allocation for the community in which it lives. These
experiments will consist of some average level of behaviour based on the ex-
perience of past generations (norms) and resulting outcomes, and, for certain
families, a random element both unexpected and outside the control of the
couples in question. This random element in couples' lives supplies the com-
munity with information on the relative costs and benefit of different life styles
for people of similar social and economic backgrounds; that is, it supplies
information on the wellbeing of people who, for reasons unassociated with their
own desires, stray off the beaten path in one or another area offamily behaviour.
As an example, a community will be able to observe the costs and bene-
fits associated with small versus large families simply through the varying levels
of fecundity in the population. Some couples will have fewer children than
other couples with like social and economic characteristics because the wife is,
for innate biological reasons, subfecund. Over the course of time, the com-
munity at large will be able to observe how well off, happy, rich, etc. these
couples are relative to couples with average fertility levels, and thus will know
almost instinctively whether, ceteris paribu.~,they should strive for lower ferti-
lity.s Ifsubfecund couples tend on average to be worse off in terms of whatever
welfare measures the community deems important, then future generations
will do what they can to promote high fertility. Again, the community will
learn of ways to promote high fertility by "observing" families whose life styles
lead them to have above-average numbers of children.6
The point of the preceding discussion is not to suggest that this is neces-
sarily the way things are, but rather to argue that there are processes that can
lead to individual "rationality" in behaviour that do not involve complex cost-
benefit analyses or even a great deal of conscious choice at a particular point,
in time. Thus, to say that people do not plan their fertility, or are vague about
the number of children they want is not, in and of itself, a refutation of demand
models of fertility.
AN EMPIRICAL TEST
If we cannot dismiss on a priori grounds the demand side of the fertility
equation in traditional societies, are there empirical tests which might distin-
guish between the demand and the supply models? As will be seen, the diffi-
culty lies in deriving hypotheses from the two theories which result in different
'The "ceteris paribus" condition requires,among other things, that fecundity vary within
as well as among social and economic groups.
"Fertility-reducing or increasinglife stylesdo not necessarilycorrespond to concepts or
modern versus traditional fami'ies that is, the argument givenin the text should not be taken
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predictions for the relationship between actual fertility behaviour and other
ob.rervable characteristics of couples. The stress here is on "observable"
since many of the conceptual variables in both theories are difficult to measure
directly and thus are not available in most data sets. For the demand theory,
some examples are the opportunity costs (value) of the wife's time, the price of
children, and the family's real wealth; and for the supply niodels, "natural"
fecundity, actual rather than stated contraceptive use, and desired family size.
It is, in fact, the use of proxies to measure some of these variables that has
allowed proponents of demand and proponents of supply theories to take the
same set of statistics on a population and for each to claim victory for his
elsewhere particular perspective.
As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider the regression given in
Table 1 which is drawn from some earlier work on socio-economic determinants
of fertility in Pakistan [5]. The sample for this regression was drawn from
Pakistan's National Impact Survey (NIS) conducted iri 1968-1969,and consists
of women between the ages of 35 and 49, who were married at the time of
this survey.? The variables and their construction are discussed in detail
(5]; definitions are given in the Appendix.
As the table indicates, the proxies used to measure the family's wealth
position are the husband's education, and some characteristics of the house in
which the family resides. If one accepts this interpretation, then the demand-
theory hypothesis that wealthier families have more children is supported by
virtually every wealth proxy. The major price-related proxy is the education
level of the wife, and again, under this interpretation the demand argument
that an increase in the opportunity cost of a wife's time leads to lower fertility is
supported.s And, finally, the unimportance of the other variables in the regres-
sion (with the exception of the family's mortality experience) can be taken as an
indication that in Pakistan cultural differences in couples' backgrounds play
no role in influencing fertility after one controls for differences in individual
characteristics in the pQpulation. .
Can this regression be taken as validation, at least for Pakistan, of
demand theories of fertility? Proponents of supply-oriented explanations for
variations in fertility would argue that it cannot be on the grounds that each
coefficient in Table 1 can be explained purely on the basis of supply considera-
tions.1I One frequently~cited example is the negative effe.ct of wife's education
1The lower end of the age range is designed to restrict the sample to women who have
completed or nearly completed their fertile period. The upper end is a survey-imposed
maximum age.
8Theuse of sChoolingas a proxy for the value of wife's time for Pakistani womenreceives
strong support from a forthcoming study [9] on the relationship between female schooling and
wage rates for women who choose to work. .
. .Citing sources of the supply explanations given in the text is not an easy matter since
many have yet to be set down in the literature. One exception is [7]. The sources ofmaIiy
of the supply arguments that J give aboveare discussions and debates on s1JPplyversus demand
explanations of fertility that have taken place in conferences and private conversations over the
past several years. Of particular importance are the recent.JUSSP workshop on Household
Models of Economic-Demographic Decision-making in Developing Countries held in Mexico
City.in November 1976, and private conversation with Richard Easterlin of Pennsylvania
University, and John Bongaarts of the Population Council.
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N = 861; R2 = 0.10; F = 7.62
Source: [5,p. 96].
Note: See Appendixfor definitionof variables.
DataBase:The 1967-68NationalImpact Survey(Pakistan).
on the number of children ever born to her. Demand theorists treat female
education as a price variable, and take the negative sign of its coefficient as an
indication that demand curves for children are downward sloping. In contrast,
8upply proponents argue that the negative wife's education coefficient results
not from behavioural responses to changes in the price of children, but from the
fact that more education implies, on average, higher age at marriage, and higher
education levels of contraceptive knowledge and contraceptive use. Thus, female
education "reduces" fertility because (1) it shortens the period over which
women are at risk of becoming pregnant; and (2) it acts as a proxy for separat-
ing those couples who are truly at natural fertility levels from those trying to
reduce their fertility to levels below natural fertility rates. In this explanation,
behaviour, in the sense of a response to changing relative prices, does not
enter the picture.
.,...
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The Impact data on which this regression is based allow us to determine
at least tentatively which of these competing explanations is more likely to be
true. First, the data give for each married woman the age at which she married,
so we can control for duration of marriage by including in the regression age at
marriage along with the wife's current age; second, we can eliminate the role
played by modern contraception by stratifying the sample into thos~ who have
ever used and those who have never used any form of modern contraception 10
(the NIS contains detailed information on current and past contraceptive
use).
It is important to note that, econometrically, neither of these "controls"
may be legitimate because both age at marriage and contraceptive use are likely
to be influenced by a couple's desires for children; that is, the causal relationship
between these variables and fertility may not be unidirectional. When a jointly-
determined or endogenous variable is treated as an exogenous variable, as is the
case in the following empirical work, we run the risk of introducing simultaneity
bias into the analysis. Because of this potential bias, the tests described below
must be viewed as tentative.
Differences between the contracepting and noncontracepting populations
of Pakistan are well illustrated by a simple comparison of the mean characteris-
tics of the two groups. These comparisons are given in Table 2 in which the
sample used for the regression in Table 1 is stratified along ever used/never used
lines. The most striking comparison is that for a number of children ever born
for the two groups-contraceptors had on average 1.1 more children ever born
than those who said that they had never used any form of modern contraception.
This is true even though duration of marriage is approximately the same for the
two groups, and female education levels are substantially higher for ever-used
than for never-used women. Further, mortality levels among the children of
those couples who have never used contraceptives are on the other of 40 percent
higher than mortality levels among users' children. This means that for women
between 35 and 49 in 1968-1969, those who had ever used contraceptives had
on average 28 percent more living children than those couples who had never
used modern contraceptives.
While several interpretations can be attached to these comparisons, I
suggest that one strong possibility is that much contraceptive use in Pakistan
during the period covered by the Impact Survey was demand determined. Put
another way, it was those couples who found themselves with unexpectedly
high numbers of children ever born and living children who sought out and used
modern forms of contraception. This interpretation receives further support
if we look not at actual fertility, but at the fertility levels which couples in the
two groups could have expected based on their own characteristics and the
average fertility of couples like them (i.e., with the same socio-economic charac-
teristics). Expected fertility can be approximated using the estimated.coefficients
ltSee the note, Table 2, for the dciinition of "modem" contraception.
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in Table 1, and the average characteristics for the two groups given in Table 2.11
For nonusers, expected. fertility based on the preceding calculation is 6.61
children per couple, which is very close to the actual average fertility for that
group (6.60 children ever born). However, for those who have ever used any
form of modern contraception, expected fertility is 6.43children ever born which
implies that on average these couples had 1.3 (7.71-6.43) more live births than
other couples in the population with similar social and economic characteristics.
Thus, it appears that fertility in excess of the already high mean fertility
levels in Pakistan induces couples to search out and use modern forms of con-
traception. . Although not central tothe purpose of this paper, it is worth noting
that almost all family planning programmes, including Pakistan's, are based
on the premise that supply and availability of contraceptives are the factors
explaining variations in contraceptive use. While the foregoing analysis does not
rule this out as a partial explanation, it does confirm that desires for specific
numbers of children also are important in influencing couples' contraceptive
behaviour; in fact, for Pakistan, these demand factors appear to dominate
contraceptive choice decisions. The figures in Table 2 also suggest that excess
or unwanted fertility occurs only at very high levels of children ever born, and
therefore that programmes aimed at reducing population growth rates must
both eliminate unwanted births, and reduce the number of wanted or desired
births.
The question that remains is whether within the noncontracepting or
natural fertility population there is any evidence that demand factors are at
work. To answer this question, the regression given in Table I was recomputed
using as the base sample only those 753 women who said that they had never
used any form of modern contraception. This regression is given as equation
2 in Table 3. Equation 3 in that table adds to the original specification the
age at which each woman was first married, thus introducing into the regression
a control for duration of marriage. The first equation in Table 3 reproduces
for ease of comparison the regression given in Table I.
The change in samples from all women to those who have never used
modern contraception is an attempt to rule out the correlation between female
education and contraception as the explanation for the negative partial correla-
tion between wife's schooling and fertility. As Table 3 indicates, dropping
women who have "ever used" from the sample makes the coefficient on wife's
education more negative and its t-ratio increases; supply explanations based
on the education/contraception correlation would have predicted a movement
in the opposite direction for both these magnitudes.
To determine whether female education is acting as a proxy for
"exposure", that is, for the length oftime over which women have been. ~t risk
of becoming pregnant, equation 3 repeats equation 2 but with the additIOn of
llShould anyone choose to check these calculations i~must be kept in ItIind that the mean
value of husband's education ~quared is not the square of mean husband's education; the





The l)emand lor Children
Table 2











Wife born in village





































aContraceptors are those who have ever used any of the following forms of modem
contraceptives: condom, diaphragm, foam, jelly or cream, tampon or sponge, IUD, Pill,
sterilization, abortion.
age at marriage as an explanatory variable. To reiterate, supply-based theories
would predict that controlling for contraceptive use and duration of exposure
ought to substantially reduce the negative partial correlation between female
education and fertility. Equation 3 rather strongly rejects this explanation-the
effect of wife's education on children ever born is essentially unchanged from
equation 1, both with regard to its absolute magnitude, and its significance
level.12 It appears, then, that even within a "natural fertility" population, and
controlling for duration of exposure, increases in female schooling still act as a
negative influence on the number of children couples' want. Demand-based
theories would predict this continued negative association; supply theories
would not.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis is concerned with distinguishing between two
competing theories that attempt to explain observed variations in fertility be-
.haviour in developing societies. The first of these theories is based on supply
considerations like fecundity, availability of contraceptives, post-partum
liThe small decreasein the t-ratio can be explained by the change in degreesof freedom
due ~o the reduction in sample size.
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amenoria. and a host of other "intermediate fertility" variables. This theory
states that variations in fertility in noncontracepting populations are due to
factors not directly related to couples' desires for children, but are, rather, the
unintended consequences of decisions made in other areas of family behaviour.
The second theory is based on a fairly straightforward application of
consumer demand theory to explain variations in the number of children
'Couples have. Under this theory, costs of having and raising children, benefits
that flow from children to parents, and resources available to couples are
postulated to explain a significant proportion of the systematic component of
variation in numbers of children among families.
To explore which of these theories better fits the facts in Pakistan, I con-
<:entrate on one particular relationship, the negative correlation between a
wife's education and a number of children that she has. Both supply and
demand theories provide explanations for that negative relationship, the first
through a correlation between female education, age at marriage, and Con-
traceptive use, and the second through a correlation between female education
and the cost of having and rearing children. To measure the relative impor-
tance of these competing explanations, I first control for the major supply
'Considerations using multivariate regression techniques. What remains is
taken to be the effect of female education on fertility which arises from the
demand side of the fertility equation, and this effect remains strongly negative
even after supply considerations are removed from the data.
Although flawed by certain methodological problems, the empirical in-
vestigation carried out in this paper points quite clearly toward the conclusion
that demand models of fertility are as effective in explaining variations in
'Children ever born in "natural fertility" populations as they are in contracepting
populations. 13 If this conclusion is supported by additional research that rules
out simultaneity as an explanation for the statistical results presented in
Table 3, then important implications for public policy emerge: Population
programmes that attempt to reduce fertility in Pakistan only by improving
<:ontraceptive availability and supply are unlikely to reduce fertility to accept-
able levels; couple's desire~ for children must also change and by substantial
amounts.
18Thisconclusion does not deny the importance of the relationship between female
-education and contraception, but it does suggest that increases in wife's schooling is a neces-
ury, but not a sufficient,condition for increasing in contraceptive use.
64 Dennis De Tray
Table 3
Regression Comparisons: All Women Versus Nonusersa ..,...
Dependent Variable: Completed Fertility
All Women Nonusers
Explanatory Variablesb (N=861) (N=753)
eq.l eq.2 eq.3
Wealth Proxies
1. Husband's education 0.38 0.27 0.2& --
(2.0) (1. 3) (I .4)
2. (Husband's education)2 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06
(2. I) (I. 3) (I .4)
3. Electricity in house 0.66 0.71 0.71
(2.6) (2.7) (2.7)
4. Modern house type 0.64 0.45 0.52
(2. I) (I.4) (I. 7)
5. Traditional house type 0.23 0.15 0.13
(0.9) (0.6) (0.5)
Price Proxies
6. Wife's education -0.33 -0.42 -0.35
(3.3) (3.7) (3.1)
7. Rural 1 0.10 0.32 0.41
(0.3) (0.83) (1. I)
8. Rural 2 -0.08 0.19 0.25
(0.2) (0.4) (0.6)
Wre's Background
9. Born in village 0.18 0.02 0.01
(0.8) (0.1) (0. OS}
10. Lived in town 0.07 0.24 0.23
(0.2) (0.7) (0.7)
11. Current age 0.05 0.05 0.06
Other Variables
(2.4) (2.1) (2.5)
12. Mortality 2.74 2.76 2.56
(6.6) (6.5) (6.1)
13. Age married -0.16 ..,.",..,..
14. Intercept 3.31 3.28 5.59
R2 0.10 0.10 0.14






















0: Cannot read or write
1: Can read, not write
2: Can read, write, grades 0, 1
3: Can read, write, grades 2-5
4: Can read, write, grades 6-9
5: Can read, write, education, other
Equals 1 if house has electricity;
0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if house type is pucca (modern
construction); 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if house type is katcha (traditional
construction); 0 otherwise.
[housing comparison group: all other
house types-mud, tin hut, etc.]
See husband's education.
Equals 1 for rural residents who visit towns
frequently or occasionally, O:otherwise.
Equals 1 for rural residents who seldom or
never visit towns; 0 otherwise.
[rural comparison group: urban dwellers)
Equals 1 if wife born in a village;
0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if wife ever lived in a town for
more than six months; 0 otherwise.
Wife's age at time of survey.
Ratio of child deaths to children ever born.
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